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Just after 6.30 p.m. on Friday, November 13, sirens sounded at RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk, England. The base is home to the US Air Force’s 48th Fighter Wing, which flies F-15E Strike Eagles and F-35A stealth fighters. Personnel were told to shelter in place. Unconfirmed reports quickly spread that Lakenheath and the nearby bases at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Feltwell had moved to FPCON Delta, the highest US force-protection level, which is normally reserved for when an attack has happened or is believed to be imminent.
The US Air Force confirmed that its security forces “responded to suspected unauthorized drone activity over RAF Lakenheath” and said that “no personnel, aircraft or infrastructure were affected”. The UK Ministry of Defence later said the incident was “now resolved” and that it was working with US forces “to establish the facts”. The number, type and origin of the drones have not been disclosed.
A pattern, not a one-off
Taken alone, a brief drone alert at an air base might not mean much. But the context matters:
- Earlier this week, Lakenheath and Mildenhall reportedly moved to FPCON Charlie, the second-highest level, without public explanation.
- On November 9, KC-135 tankers based at Mildenhall were dispersed to Prestwick, Spangdahlem, Ramstein and Morón in Spain, and CV-22B Osprey aircraft were moved to Lakenheath.
- In September, a major incident was declared on the perimeter of RAF Fairford, and the bombers based there returned to the United States.
- All of this comes as the United States and Iran exchange strikes in the Gulf, and as European countries have spent two years dealing with unexplained drone flights over airports, power stations and military sites, which several governments have linked to Russia.
No official connection has been made between these events. But dispersing aircraft and raising alert levels are not routine steps. They suggest commanders believe the threat is real.
My view: cheap drones are changing how bases are defended
The main issue is not who flew the drones over Suffolk on Friday night. It is cost. A commercial or improvised drone costs a few hundred dollars. The aircraft it can photograph, or in a war could strike, cost more than US$100 million each. The war in Ukraine has shown repeatedly that small drones can find and destroy expensive equipment parked on the ground.
Western bases were designed for a world in which the main air threats were enemy aircraft and missiles, detected early and dealt with by expensive systems. That approach does not work well against swarms of small, slow, low-flying drones that can be launched from a field outside the perimeter. Effective counter-drone defence requires detection, electronic jamming, and the legal authority to bring drones down over civilian land. In Britain, that authority is divided between the military, the police and civil aviation regulators.
Countries in Southeast Asia should pay attention. Indonesia’s air bases, ports and energy facilities face the same imbalance. Counter-drone systems are now basic infrastructure, not optional extras.
Sources: The Aviationist; The War Zone; NewsBytes.
