From parliamentary democracy to Guided Democracy: why Indonesia’s first democratic experiment ended, 1950–1959

Between 1950 and 1957 Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy. It had seven cabinets in seven years, a free and lively press, and, in 1955, what is still regarded as one of the freest and fairest elections in its history. By July 1959 that system was gone, replaced by Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin). Why did Indonesia’s first democratic experiment fail? The question links the country’s history to the comparative study of democratic breakdown, and it is one of the most productive debates in Indonesian political studies.

The constitutional framework

After the Dutch transferred sovereignty in December 1949 and the short-lived federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia was dissolved, the unitary republic adopted the Provisional Constitution of 1950 (UUDS 1950). It created a parliamentary system: cabinets were responsible to parliament, and the president, Sukarno, was mainly a ceremonial head of state. Real power lay with the parties and the prime minister.

The 1955 elections and stalemate

The long-delayed elections were held in September 1955 for parliament and December 1955 for the Konstituante, the body that was to write a permanent constitution. Turnout was over 90 percent. The result divided the electorate into four large parties of roughly similar size: the Indonesian National Party (PNI) with about 22 percent, Masyumi (modernist Islam) with about 21 percent, Nahdlatul Ulama (traditionalist Islam) with about 18 percent, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with about 16 percent. No party could govern alone, and the divisions followed religious, ideological and regional lines. PNI and PKI were strongest in Java, Masyumi in the Outer Islands.

Rather than resolving the political conflict, the elections confirmed it. Cabinets remained short-lived. The Konstituante became deadlocked over the basis of the state, with Islamic parties on one side and nationalist and communist parties on the other.

Feith’s explanation: administrators and solidarity makers

Herbert Feith’s The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962) remains the essential text. Feith distinguished two types of political leader. Administrators, such as Mohammad Hatta and the Socialist Party’s Sjahrir, had the technical and legal skills to run a modern state and favoured gradual, rule-based development. Solidarity makers, of whom Sukarno was the leading example, had the skills to mobilise people through symbols, ideology and nationalist appeals.

The parliamentary system, Feith argued, depended on the administrators, but they lacked a mass following. As economic problems and regional discontent grew, politics shifted towards the solidarity makers. Hatta’s resignation as vice president in December 1956 symbolised the end of the partnership between the two types of leader.

Feith’s typology has been criticised for being too focused on elites and for implying that Indonesian political culture was not suited to liberal democracy. Even so, it remains a valuable account of the gap between how the institutions were designed and how political power actually worked.

Lev’s explanation: crisis and the army

Daniel Lev’s The Transition to Guided Democracy (1966) gives a more detailed account of the critical years 1957–1959. He emphasises a series of crises that the parliamentary system could not handle:

• Regional rebellions. Military commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi, unhappy with Jakarta’s control and the centralisation of export revenue, took control of their regions in 1956–57. This led to the PRRI/Permesta rebellions of 1958, which received covert US support.
• Martial law. In March 1957, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet resigned and Sukarno declared martial law (Staat van Oorlog en Beleg). That gave the army, under General A. H. Nasution, a formal political and administrative role it never fully gave up.
• The Konstituante deadlock. When the assembly failed three times to reach a two-thirds majority on returning to the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno, backed by the army, issued the Decree of 5 July 1959. It dissolved the Konstituante and restored the 1945 Constitution with its strong presidency.

Lev’s central point is that Guided Democracy was a coalition between Sukarno and the army, with the PKI as a third, increasingly powerful partner. That three-way balance, often described as a triangle, would shape Indonesian politics until it collapsed violently in 1965.

Later interpretations

Benedict Anderson’s essay “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture” (1972) offered a cultural explanation for Guided Democracy, linking Sukarno’s style to traditional ideas of concentrated, sacred power. Critics have argued that this explanation is too culturally deterministic. Political economists, by contrast, emphasise the economic crisis: inflation, smuggling in the Outer Islands and the 1957–58 nationalisation of Dutch enterprises, which put large parts of the economy under army management. Rex Mortimer’s study of the PKI (1974) shows how Guided Democracy allowed the party to grow while denying it real power.

Comparative significance

Indonesia’s case fits several themes from Linz’s study of democratic breakdown: fragmentation in parliament, regional rebellion, an ambitious head of state and an army entering politics. It also anticipates current debates about executive aggrandisement, in which elected leaders expand their power by apparently legal means. The 5 July decree was justified as a return to the original founding document, not as a break with the constitution. Students should notice how often authoritarian changes are presented as restorations.

Questions for seminar discussion

• Was Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy doomed by social structure, or did it fail because of particular decisions in 1956–59?
• Is Feith’s distinction between “administrators” and “solidarity makers” still useful for understanding Indonesian leadership today?
• What were the long-term consequences of the army’s political role beginning with the 1957 martial law?

References and further reading

• Anderson, B. R. O’G. (1972). The idea of power in Javanese culture. In C. Holt (Ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (pp. 1–69). Cornell University Press.
• Feith, H. (1962). The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Cornell University Press.
• Feith, H. (1957). The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
• Kahin, A. R., & Kahin, G. McT. (1995). Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. The New Press.
• Legge, J. D. (1972). Sukarno: A Political Biography. Allen Lane.
• Lev, D. S. (1966). The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
• Mortimer, R. (1974). Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965. Cornell University Press.
• Ricklefs, M. C. (2008). A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (4th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.